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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW-Preindict-
ment Identification Confrontation Held Not To Be Critical
Stage Of The Prosecution Where The Accused's Right To
Counsel Attaches.
On February 22, 1968, Thomas Kirby and a companion named
Ralph Bean were stopped by police on Madison Street in Chicago be-
cause Kirby resembled a man wanted by the police for an unrelated
criminal offense. Both men produced personal papers bearing the
same name, Willie Shard, and when they gave conflicting explanations
concerning these papers they were arrested. Upon arrival at the sta-
tion, the police discovered that two days earlier one Willie Shard had
reported that two men had robbed him of his wallet containing per-
sonal identification and travelers checks.
Shard was contacted and brought to the station. Immediately upon
seeing Kirby and Bean he positively identified them as the pair that
had perpetrated the robbery.' When Shard first saw Kirby and Bean
at the station the pair was sitting at a table in an interrogation room
with a number of police officers. Six weeks later Kirby and Bean
were indicted for the robbery of Shard. At the arraignment proceed-
ings counsel was first appointed to represent them.2
At the trial Kirby made timely motions to suppress Shard's testi-
mony on the theory that he had been denied his sixth and fourteenth
amendment right to counsel and the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rule
should therefore be invoked. These motions were denied and Shard
was permitted to testify with respect to his pretrial identification of
Kirby at the police station. Shard also identified the defendants in the
courtroom as being the same two men who had robbed him on Febru-
ary 20.' The defense thoroughly cross-examined Shard with respect
to circumstances surrounding his identification at the police station.
Nevertheless, the jury found both men guilty of robbery.
1. Kirby and Bean were sitting at a table with a number of police officers.
Although Shard was brought to the station for the purpose of identifying two persons
suspected of robbing him, there was no formal lineup.
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §113-3 (1971) requires that counsel be provided for
indigent defendants prior to arraignment.
3. Bean's conviction was reversed, People v. Bean. 121 Ill. App. 2d 232, 257 N.E.
2d 562 (1970) holding that Shard's identification was the product of an unlawful arrest,
search and detention. Thus Shard's identification testimony was inadmissible as to
Bean.
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In his appeal, Kirby argued that it was reversible error for the trial
court to allow the introduction of the identification testimony into evi-
dence, since he had been without benefit of counsel at the pretrial con-
frontation. Kirby urged that the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rule, for-
mulated by the United States Supreme Court in 1967, was clearly ap-
plicable.' The Illinois Appellate Court rejected Kirby's contention
and affirmed the conviction.5 The court relied on an earlier Illinois
decision, People v. Palmer,' which held that the Wade-Gilbert per se
exclusionary rule was not applicable to preindictment identification con-
frontations. The Palmer case limited the per se exclusionary rule to
post-indictment situations.' The United States Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari8 to consider whether a pretrial con-
frontation between a suspect not yet indicted and an identifying
witness is a critical stage in the prosecution at which time the right to
counsel attaches.9  The prior Supreme Court decisions of United
States v. Wade'0 and Gilbert v. California" held that a post indictment
pretrial "lineup" at which an accused is exhibited to identifying wit-
nesses is a "critical stage of a criminal prosecution."' 2  The Court
stated that it was an infringement of the accused's sixth and four-
teenth amendment rights to conduct such a lineup without the pres-
ence of counsel, absent a knowing, intelligent waiver.'"
In Kirby v. Illinois, 4 the Supreme Court refused to extend the
Wade-Gilbert doctrine to the situation where a suspect had not yet
been indicted. Therefore, a pretrial preindictment identification will
not be excluded solely on the grounds that there was no counsel pres-
ent.
This holding removes the preindictment identification procedures
from the status of the "critical stage." Suspects no longer must be
provided with the assistance of counsel prior to participating in identi-
fication confrontations. Nevertheless, an unfair confrontation which
may lead to a false identification may still be excluded, but the onus is
4. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967).
5. People v. Kirby, 121 Ill. App. 2d 323, 257 N.E.2d 589 (1970).
6. 41 111. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
7. Id. at 573, 244 N.E.2d at 174.
8. 402 U.S. 995 (1971).
9. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
10. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
11. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
12. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
13. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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now on the defendant to prove that the confrontation was, in fact, un-
fair.
THE Wade-Gilbert EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In order to fully analyze the opinion15 of the Court, there must
first be a discussion of United States v. Wade,18 Gilbert v. Califor-
nia,17 and the resulting per se exclusionary rule.
The fact situation presented in Wade involved a lineup confronta-
tion after the defendant had been indicted for robbing a federally in-
sured bank. The FBI, without first notifying the defendant's ap-
pointed counsel, conducted a lineup composed of the defendant to-
gether with several other prisoners. Two witnesses identified Wade
as the robber. Thereafter, he was convicted, but in his appeal he
challenged the admission of the identification testimony offered by a
witness in attendance at the lineup. The basis of his contention was
that since he was not represented by counsel at the pretrial identifica-
tion, his sixth amendment rights were violated.
The Court, per Mr. Justice Brennan, held that a post indictment
lineup
[w]as a critical stage of the prosecution at which he [the accused]
was as much entitled to such aid [of Counsel] . .. as at the trial
itself. 18
The Court arrived at this conclusion after reviewing the possible
abuses that could occur in lineups as well as other identification pro-
cedures.19 The Court observed that once a witness makes an identifi-
cation at a lineup he will generally not reverse himself at trial, thus
solidifying in his mind what could be the product of an unfairly sug-
gestive lineup procedure. 20
The Wade Court further emphasized that: "The influence of im-
proper suggestion probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice
than any other factor. ' 21  In order to prevent any unfairness during
15. Kirby was a plurality decision, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Blackmun,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist with the Chief Justice concurring separately in the Opinion of
the Court with Mr. Justice Powell concurring only in the result. Mr. Justice Brennan,joined by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion.
Mr. Justice White wrote a separate dissent.
16. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
17. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
18. 388 U.S. at 236-37, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
19. id. at 232-34. Intentionally or unintentionally, the police could place other
persons in the lineup with the suspect who are not of similar appearance, skin tone,
size, color, hair, race, dress, height, weight, clothes sizes, similar identifying character-
istics, etc.
20. Id. at 229.
21. Id. See also BROWN, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY, p. 71 (1926); 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
552, 554 (1955).
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the pretrial period, the Court held that an accused should have the
benefit of counsel at identification confrontations. The Court stated:
Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice in pre-
trial lineups, and since the presence of counsel itself can often
avert such prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial
.. .the presence of counsel at pretrial lineups must be assured
when possible. 22
The pretrial lineup is often that point in the prosecution when an
identification becomes settled in the mind of a prospective witness,
thereby reducing the in court identification to a "mere formality."23
Thus the Court decided that since there was such a grave potential for
unfair suggestion and prejudice at certain identification confrontations,
counsel should be present as the first line of defense. With the infor-
mation gained by counsel when observing the particular pretrial con-
frontation, he could effectively cross-examine key identifying witnesses,
and hopefully reveal any prejudice or unfairness that may have tran-
spired.24 Identification evidence resulting from confrontations not in
compliance with this procedure would be excluded.
In Wade, the Court noted that where an illegal pretrial lineup
had been conducted, an in court identification would be admissible
only if the government could show by clear and convincing evidence
that it was independent and separate from the tainted lineup.26
Of course, proving that the in court identification was independent
and separate from the tainted lineup would often prove to be an impos-
sible task for the state. It is difficult to see how the government
could show, by clear and convincing evidence, that an illegal lineup,
22. 388 U.S. at 236-37. See also Murray, The Criminal Lineup at Home and
Abroad, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 610, 627-28.
23. 388 U.S. at 226. The Court further stated:
The trial which might determine the accused's fate may well be not in the
courtroom, but at the pretrial confrontation-the State aligned against the
accused, the witness the sole jury, the accused unprotected against intentional
or unintentional unfairness with little or no appeal from the judgment ren-
dered by the witness-"That's the Man!"
Id. at 235, 236. See also BORC-IAR, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932). This work
illustrates twenty-nine cases of erroneous identifications leading to incarceration of the
innocent. In only two of those cases did the guilty party even physically resemble the
accused. WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES, pg. 26 (1965). This
work presents a thorough discussion of the unreliability of eyewitness identifications.
24. It is important to note here that the fact situation in which Wade was decided
was a post indictment pretrial confrontation.
25. The Court referred to an illegal lineup as a pretrial but post indictment lineup
held without accused's counsel, absent an intelligent waiver and absent any emergency
situation.
26. 388 U.S. at 240. Wade was remanded to the district court for a hearing de-
terminative on the independence of the in-court identification consistent with the opin-
ion. See also BROWN, supra note 21, at 71 (1926); 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 552, 554
(1955).
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once viewed, could play no part whatsoever in a subsequent in court
identification.
A companion case, Gilbert v. California,27 in which Mr. Justice
Brennan again wrote the opinion of the Court, held that it was error
to admit into evidence an in court identification without first deter-
mining that it was of independent origin and untainted by a prior ille-
gal lineup. In a prosecution for armed robbery and murder, the ac-
cused was identified at a post indictment lineup without counsel pres-
ent. The officers told the witnesses present at the lineup, "if they had
any doubts, now was the time to resolve them, not at trial." The ac-
cused was promptly identified by the group of witnesses, who at no
time had their communications with each other restricted.
The Court held in light of Wade, that these identifications were in-
admissible and stated further:
Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an
effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will
respect the accused's constitutional right to the presence of his
counsel at the critical lineup. 28
As the result of these two decisions, the so-called Wade-Gilbert rule
has emerged. In effect, this rule excludes any identification testimony
from a witness who was present at an illegal lineup, i.e., a lineup in
which defendant was not given an opportunity for effective assistance
of counsel.
Stovall v. Denno29 can cause the loss of the entire testimony by the
witness if he had attended an illegal pretrial lineup or confrontation.
If the police had had all of the identification witnesses attending that
tainted lineup, the court would then be obligated to scrutinize that
pretrial confrontation and exclude any testimony which was so tainted.
Thus, all of the state's identification testimony could be lost to the
case. Many prosecutors felt that Stovall's long-range effect could be
even more far-reaching and lasting than Wade's.
THE PRE-Kirby APPLICATION OF THE Per Se RULE
The prevailing view when applying the Wade-Gilbere° rule was
27. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). Actually three cases were handed down the same day,
the third being Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) holding Wade and Gilbert
applicable prospectively only. Stovall also affirmed the rule that the Court must
scrutinize every pretrial confrontation to assure its fundamental fairness.
28. 388 U.S. at 273.
29. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
30. See 406 U.S. at 704 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The states were split in
application, thirteen states adopting the federal application of Wade, while five states
including Illinois (People v. Palmer) opted for the narrow and strict construction appli-
cation holding Wade-Gilbert to apply only in post indictment factual situations.
1973
Loyola University Law Journal
that it applied to preindictment confrontations, as well as post indict-
ment situations."1 Every federal jurisdiction had applied the rule in
this manner. In Wilson v. Gaffney,32 the court stated:
But surely the assistance of counsel, now established as an absolute
post-indictment right does not arise or attach because of the return
of an indictment. . . . Every reason set forth by the Supreme
Court in Wade . . . for the assistance of counsel post-indictment
has equal or more impact when projected against a pre-indictment
atmosphere. 33
In Rivers v. United States,14 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ob-
served that Wade and Gilbert indicated that a confrontation between
suspects and witnesses was a critical stage and unless waived, counsel
must be present. The court went on to state:
[I]t is indisputable that most, perhaps all, confrontations occur-
ring after arrest fall within the rules announced in Wade and Gil-
bert. Any suggestion that the rules announced apply only to for-
mal lineups is seriously weakened by Stovall.3 5
While Rivers was a liberal construction of Wade and Gilbert, United
States v. Greene"6 stands as the high-water mark of the rule's appli-
cation. In Greene, the accused had been identified at a pre-arrest
confrontation arranged by the police. The court held that it was re-
versible error to admit the testimony concerning that confrontation
into evidence, stating:
We find its [Wade-Gilbert] requirements of counsel equally ap-
plicable to the informal, pre-arrest confrontation of appellant in
the squad room. 37
The court observed that the question of fairness is just as crucial in a
preindictment situation as in a post indictment confrontation.
The majority of the state courts which had considered the question
of Wade's applicability to preindictment situations agreed with the
federal interpretation.' 8 A representative case is People v. Gowler."9
31. Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1972): Gov't of Virgin Islands v.
Callwood. 440 F.2d 1206 (3rd Cir. 1971); United States v. Greene. 429 F.2d 193 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Cooper v. Picard. 428 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1970): United States v. Ayers,
426 F.2d 524 (2nd Cir. 1970); United States v. Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Broadhead. 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969).
32. 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1972).
33. Id. at 144.
34. 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968).
35. 400 F.2d at 939, 940; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
36. 429 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
37. Id. at 195.
38. The thirteen states which adopted the federal application were California,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Texas. Washington and Wisconsin.
39. 1 Cal. 3d 335, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 461 P.2d 643 (1969).
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The case involved a preindictment lineup conducted in the absence
of defendant's counsel. The California Supreme Court held:
We have concluded that the Wade-Gilbert Rules are not limited
in their application to lineups occurring after indictment. Our
reasons are several. First, and perhaps most importantly, we
find nothing in the reasoning of those opinions . . . requiring
that the rules should be so limited [to post indictment situations]
.... A lineup which occurs prior to the point in question [indict-
ment] may be fraught with the same risks of suggestion as one oc-
curring after that point, and may result in the same far-reaching
consequences for the defendant. 40
Taking a distinct minority position, the Illinois Supreme Court in
People v. Palmer4 refused to apply the Wade-Gilbert rule to pre-
indictment situations. Palmer was convicted of robbing a cab driver.
During the robbery the victim had ample opportunity to study and ob-
serve his assailant. When the victim was provided with photos of for-
merly convicted robbers he identified Palmer's picture. The police
and the victim went to Palmer's residence to effect an arrest. There-
upon, the victim immediately identified Palmer as his robber. The
victim's identification testimony which consisted of an in court identifi-
cation and testimony concerning the pretrial identification confronta-
tion, was allowed at trial. In his appeal, Palmer complained that the
admission of the identification testimony was in clear contravention of
the Wade-Gilbert rule. However the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
Palmer's contention stating:
The confrontation here was immediately following the defendant's
arrest and prior to his indictment and the appointment of counsel,
and the decisions of Wade and Gilbert are not binding .... 42
Thus, in Illinois, the right to counsel at an identification confrontation
attached only after an indictment had been returned.
40. Id. at 342, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 368, 461 P.2d at 648. In Palmer v. State, 5 Md.
App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (1967) the Maryland Court of Appeals reached a similar re-
sult basing their reasoning upon the necessity of having a fair and meaningful cross-
examination at trial. The Maryland court excluded all identification evidence (testi-
mony) which was tainted by exhibiting the accused to identifying witnesses in absence
of accused's counsel which was not subject to objective review at the trial. At p. 486
the Palmer court said: "We think it necessarily follows that the rules of Wade and
Gilbert apply also to a lineup conducted before indictment and to other pretrial con-
frontations within the meaning of Tyler." Tyler v. State, 5 Md. App. 265, 246 A.2d
634 (1968), held that Wade applies the exclusionary rule only to those confrontations
which are not subject to objective review at trial by cross-examination.
41. 41 Ill. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969). In all, five states constituted the
minority view: Arizona, Florida, Missouri, and Virginia along with Illinois. State v.
Field, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969); Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla.
1969); State v. Walters, 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1970); Buchanan v. Commonwealth,
210 Va. 664, 173 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
42. 41 Ill. 2d 571, 573, 248 N.E.2d 173, 175 (1969). See also People v. Elam,
50 Ill. 2d 214, 218, 278 N.E,2d 76, 77 (1972).
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In State v. Fields,43 an Arizona court reached the same result as
in People v. Palmer. However the court qualified its refusal to expand
Wade-Gilbert to preindictment situations by noting its duty to scru-
tinize every pre-trial confrontation and guarantee the fairness of the
identification process. 4 In Perkins v. State,45 the Florida Supreme
Court, in a preindictment context, enunciated a narrow construction of
the Wade-Gilbert rule stating:
We are not unmindful that the identification process involved in
the present case may well bespeak the characteristics common to
the infirmities found objectionable in the Wade and Gilbert de-
cisions.40
However, the Perkins court felt that to apply the logical extension of
the Wade rule to a preindictment case would be an extension better
left to the United States Supreme Court.
The pre-Kirby period was marked by a clear division. The ma-
jority of courts (and all federal courts) would extend the Wade-Gilbert
per se exclusionary rule to the preindictment situation and thus ex-
clude all identification testimony originating in a confrontation which
occurred absent the accused's counsel, regardless of whether it oc-
curred preindictment or post indictment. The minority of courts, in-
cluding Illinois, would not so exclude preindictment confrontation
evidence.
PREINDICTMENT CONFRONTATIONS ARE NOT CRITICAL STAGES IN
THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
In Kirby v. Illinois47 the Supreme Court adopted the minority posi-
tion and held that the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rule applies after the
commencement of formal judicial proceedings. Judicial proceedings
may be commenced by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, in-
dictment, information, or arraignment. At this point the state is
aligned against the accused and the adverse positions of the govern-
ment and the defendant have generally solidified.4 8 The Court rea-
soned that the accused does not formally face the state until these ini-
43. 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969).
44. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Stovall held that the Due Process Clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments forbids a lineup which is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive
to irreparable mistaken identification charging the courts with a duty to scrutinize any
pretrial confrontation for unfairness.
45. 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1969).
46. Id. at 390.
47. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
48. While Kirby charges the State with the duty to provide counsel only when the
adversary criminal process has begun, it remains for the states to determine when that
point is actually reached. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that the criminal
process (adversary judicial proceedings) begins-with the filing of a complaint and the
220
Vol. 4: 213
Case Comments
tial steps toward criminal prosecution have been taken, and therefore
the right to counsel need not attach.
49
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing the opinion of the Court, rejected the
applicability of Miranda v. Arizona 0 to the instant case; viewing
Miranda as primarily related to the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and not determinative of a sixth amendment con-
troversy. The majority indicated there was no question of a fifth
amendment violation in Kirby," ' but rather, a sixth amendment in-
fringement was at issue. Similarly, a prior decision in Escobedo v.
Illinois 2 was decided in a fact situation which went to the fifth
amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. In Esco-
bedo, however, the Court determined that the critical stage where the
accused was constitutionally entitled to a lawyer was before indict-
ment at the interrogation. In Escobedo, the Court announced
the "focus theory," observing that it would exalt form over substance
to make the right to counsel depend on whether at the time of the
interrogation the authorities had secured a formal indictment. Rather,
the test for when the right to counsel attaches should be when the
police investigation turned from a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime to an investigation centering on a specific suspect.
As in Gilbert and Wade, the Escobedo Court stated that only a per
se exclusionary rule as to such tainted testimony could be an effective
sanction to insure that law enforcement authorities will respect the ac-
cused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical
stage.
The Kirby decision limits the Wade-Gilbert rule's application to the
post indictment period. The Court departed from not only the Esco-
bedo rationale5 3 but from the long line of Supreme Court decisions 4
issuing of a warrant. Thus in Missouri, the right to counsel would attach at that time.
On the other hand, Massachusetts, a state which had applied the majority liberal in-
terpretation of Wade has expressly disavowed its earlier decision and now applies the
right to counsel only after indictment.
49. 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1030-34 (1964).
50. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
51. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
52. 378 U.S. 478 (1963).
53. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
54. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) the sixth amendment right to
counsel was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. In
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), the right to counsel was extended past the
trial, to any proceeding, including interrogation by the police after formal charge. Mr.
Justice Stewart, concurring in Spano, went so far as to compare any police interrogation
after formal charge against the standard of a public trial, observing that in our system,
an indictment is supposed to be followed by an arraignment and trial with all con-
stitutional guarantees. Mr. Justice Stewart believes that any stage after trial should
have at least those safeguards and guarantees. In Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964), incriminating evidence which the police elicited from defendant
1973
Loyola University Law Journal
which had been expanding55 the right to counsel rather than limiting it.
However, the Court expressly retained the safeguards of Stovall v.
Denno:50
What has been said is not to suggest that there may not be occa-
sions during the course of a criminal investigation when the police
do abuse identification procedures. Such abuses are not beyond
the reach of the Constitution. As the Court pointed out in Wade
itself, it is always necessary to "scrutinize any pretrial confronta-
tio n . .. .. 57
The plurality of the Kirby Court considered the identification con-
frontation here to be merely a routine police procedure and were
loathe to burden the police with the duty to provide an accused with
counsel. Conversely, the Wade Court found no countervailing policy
considerations against requiring the presence of counsel at lineups,
emphasizing that an attorney is an essential part of the criminal proc-
ess58 and that the possibility of occasional delays to police procedure
not worth the risk of the potential prejudice which could result from
an unfair lineup.
There are two apparent explanations for the opposite treatment of
this problem. First, as the Wade Court stated:
Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police de-
partments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional
suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaning-
ful confrontation at trial may also remove the basis for regarding
the stage as critical.5
There is some evidence that police have modified their regulations to
conform to the Wade guidelines.60 Second, the personnel changes in
the Court subsequent to Wade indicate a change in attitude towards
the rights of the accused. 61
after he was indicted but while he was free on bail through the use of a police informer
who was a co-defendant electronically wired to relay defendant's conversation with
him to the police was held to be inadmissible against him at trial. The fatal defect in
the evidence procurement was that the defendant had been denied his constitutional
right to counsel while the police recorded his conversation. Both Miranda and
Escobedo also extended the right to counsel to "every critical stage of the prosecution."
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1963).
55. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970).
56. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
57. 406 U.S. at 690-91.
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
59. 388 U.S. at 239.
60. See Murray, supra note 22, 627-28. Prof. Murray comments on the regula-
tions of the Washington D.C. Police Dep't concerning lineups after Wade.
61. Of the Justices who heard Wade, only Mr. Justice Stewart joined the plurality in
Kirby. The other four Justices of the plurality (Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice
Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with Mr. Justice Powell concurring) are all re-
cent appointees. The dissent, on the other hand, was composed of four Justices, all of
whom were on the Court when Wade was decided.
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Mr. Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion of the Court in both
Wade and Gilbert, strenuously dissented in Kirby,62 taking the plural-
ity Justices to task for their narrow interpretation of Wade and Gilbert.
Mr. Justice Brennan disputed the plurality's conclusion that Miranda
did not apply to the Kirby situation. He observed that Miranda re-
quired that as soon as Kirby was taken into custody, he should have
been informed of his right to counsel. Mr. Justice Brennan observed
that the controlling sixth amendment decisions63 reflect the constitu-
tional principle that in addition to having the right to presence of coun-
sel at trial, the accused is also guaranteed that he need not stand alone
against the state at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in
court or out, wherever counsel's absence might derogate from his right
to a fair trial. 4
Similarly, Justice Brennan disagreed with the plurality's expedious
disposition of the Escobedo case,6 5 questioning how Escobedo could
be applicable in Wade (which was a post indictment situation) and
not in Kirby (which, like Escobedo, was a preindictment confronta-
tion).65 Moreover, Justice Brennan was distressed by the plurality's
reliance on the pre-Wade decision of Johnson v. New Jersey67 which
restricted Escobedo to its facts. Even if Johnson did so limit Esco-
bedo, Escobedo was specifically relied upon by the Wade and Gilbert
Courts to reach their results.
The spirit of the Wade decision is embodied in Mr. Justice Bren-
nan's dissent. He notes that a confrontation for identification purposes
is a very sensitive process, peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers
and variables which might adversely affect a trial. 68  The sixth amend-
ment guarantees that the accused shall have the benefit of counsel to
provide him with a meaningful defense.69 If any impropriety occurs
62. 406 U.S. 691 (1972).
63. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
64. 388 U.S. at 218-27.
65. Of course, in its grant of certiorari, 402 U.S. 995 (1971), the Court limited its
review only to deciding the application of Wade-Gilbert. But Justice Brennan felt that
Wade-Gilbert depended so heavily on Miranda that one cannot apply Wade and discard
Miranda.
66. 406 U.S. at 693, n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. 384 U.S. 719, 733-34 (1966).
68. 388 U.S. at 226.
69. See Read, Lawyers at Lineups; Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extrava-
gance?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 339 (1969).
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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which might be conducive to making the witness identify the suspect
mistakenly, an effective tool to show irregularity would be cross-ex-
amination. However an accused can seldom reconstruct the pretrial
identification at the trial. An accused is untrained to detect suggestive
influences and at the highly emotional confrontation he might be una-
ware of unfairness. 70  Furthermore, at the trial the jury would proba-
bly be more apt to believe the policeman than a defendant's unsup-
ported version of the confrontation. For all these reasons, by virtue
of his training, an attorney at the confrontation can most effectively
protect the rights of an accused.
Nonetheless, the attorney may be a poor choice to be cast in the
role ot an observer.71  The attorney, by virtue of his training and his
obligation to his client, is an advocate. The attorney's first duty is
owed to his client, and not to guarantee the complete objectivity of
the confrontation. Furthermore, the attorney would have no real con-
trol over the proceedings, and may have an interest in preserving
error for use on appeal.
An additional practical argument against providing attorneys at pre-
indictment lineups is the great potential for delay. The police would
be forced to schedule lineups for the convenience of both witnesses
and attorneys, a feat which would often prove difficult.72 Moreover,
the presence of counsel could possibly inject a "courtroom" procedure
into a routine police function which could possibly harass the witness
and make the job of finding co-operative witnesses an added burden.78
CONCLUSION
The original broad application of the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary
rule was fraught with exceptions. 4  The right to counsel at pretrial
confrontations was not required when: the suspect was not in cus-
tody; 71 the pretrial confrontation was accidental; 76 the confrontation
occurred with the police in "hot pursuit" of the suspect; 77 the suspect's
70. See BROWN, supra note 21. Another very interesting, and very short dissent
in Kirby is Mr. Justice White's. This dissent is simply that Wade and Gilbert control,
and the Illinois decision should be reversed. It is interesting that Justice White was one
of the original dissenters to Wade and Gilbert. Thus even an original dissenter to Wade
sees that Wade's logic was meant to apply to a preindictment situation also.
71. See Note, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 251, 260 (1968).
72. Read, supra note 69.
73. Id. at 341.
74. 388 U.S. at 272-73.
75. United States v. Cox. 428 F.2d 683 (7th Cir.) cert. den. 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
76. United States v. Pollack, 427 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.) cert. den. 400 U.S. 831
(1970).
77. Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.) cert. den. 395 U.S. 928
(1969).
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photograph was exhibited to identifying witnesses;78 or to scientific
procedures identifying the suspect.79 However, the exceptions were
necessary because of the obvious countervailing considerations which
weighed heavily in favor of not applying the exclusionary rule in those
particular circumstances.
If the suspect were not in custody, there would be no way for the state
to provide the benefit of counsel for every possible confrontation which
may occur. Likewise, accidental confrontations are not controlled by
the police. Furthermore there is no realistic way that counsel can be pro-
vided prior to a confrontation which no one knew was going to take
place. Policemen arriving at the scene of a recently perpetrated crime
would fail in their duty to society if they did not immediately apprehend
the suspect and present him to the on-the-scene witnesses so as to satisfy
themselves that they did in fact apprehend the right man. Exhibiting
photographs of suspects to witnesses is often the only available tech-
nique by which efficient police work can lead to discovery of a prospec-
tive suspect's name or description. Furthermore, the fairness of photo-
graph identification and other reliable scientific procedures used to
identify criminals (fingerprints, voice prints, ballistics tests, etc.) can
be tested on cross-examination since the defense is in possession of the
same data and material surrounding the identification as the state.
When cross-examination can be used as an effective tool to bare unfair-
ness and impropriety of a particular procedure, there is little reason to
exclude the evidence.
The Kirby decision, unlike the aforementioned exceptions, is not
based upon the consideration that an identification is reliable or neces-
sary. Thus the Kirby decision, which eliminates the right to counsel
before the return of an indictment, is not properly categorized as an
"exception" to the Wade-Gilbert rule. Rather, the Kirby decision has
weakened the per se rule. One speculates that virtually all pretrial
confrontations will take place prior to indictment if feasible.
The Kirby Court does acknowledge the duty of the trial court to
scrutinize any pretrial confrontation to determine if any unfairness has
transpired to the detriment of the accused. The Wade Court however,
gave the task of guaranteeing a fair pretrial confrontation to a sus-
pect's counsel, and chose to exclude any evidence which might flow
78. United States v. Bennet, 409 F.2d 888 (2nd Cir.) cert. den. 396 U.S. 852
(1969).
79. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). (Scientific data, such as finger-
prints, blood tests, ballistics, voice prints, etc. which are subject to objective review and
cross-examination are admissible notwithstanding self-incrimination and right to counsel
theories.)
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from a confrontation which counsel did not have the opportunity to
observe. The Kirby Court, on the other hand, places the burden of
insuring fairness at the confrontation upon the discretion of the court.
The Court in Kirby misapplied the spirit, if not the letter of the de-
cision in Wade. 80  The abuses which Wade sought to avoid were in
no way connected with the return of an indictment. To be consistent
with its own reasoning, the Kirby Court should have either broadly
applied Wade and thus recognized the right to counsel at preindict-
ment confrontations or overruled Wade and its exclusionary rule.
Whereas the Wade Court squarely faced the problem and offered a
solution, (although some commentators would contend, the wrong
solution81) Kirby avoids the issue, and leaves no guidance for the fu-
ture. True, Kirby has discarded the per se exclusionary rule as to
preindictment confrontations, however, it has replaced it with nothing
more than judicial discretion.
The Kirby Court could have replaced the per se exclusionary rule
with guidelines to be applied at lineups, and other pretrial confronta-
tions. Specifically, the Court might have suggested the installation of
cameras and sound equipment to record the identification proceedings
for playback later. Such a safeguard would better serve the "quest
for truth".82 In addition to cameras and sound recorders, the Court
could have suggested a minimum of six persons as participants in the
lineup with a suspect, all of similar appearance and dress. Rules such
as these would squarely face and solve the problem which Kirby
basically ignored.
As it stands, Kirby's effect on police procedure could well be that
most identification confrontations will now take place before indict-
ment, and thus before the right to counsel attaches.8 3 Such a pro-
cedure does not protect the suspect nor society from erroneous identi-
fication.
CHARLES A. RYAN
80. A show up is generally conceded to be the most unfair of all identification
procedures. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); Foster v. California, 394
U.S. 440, 443 (1969).
81. See Read, supra note 69; Murray, supra note 22; Note, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 251
(1968).
82. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
83. People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 344, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 370, 461 P.2d 643,
650 (1969).
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